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Abstract: 
This special issue explores how and to what extent ‘hybridity’ informs national policy, doctrines, 
and military transformation in Asia. The introduction engages with three preliminary issues as 
a way to set the broader analytical context. It reviews the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ to make 
the case that versions of this notion have long been a feature of regional strategic thinking and 
practice. It similarly argues that maritime geography has had an impact on how ‘hybrid’ 
courses of actions in the region have been conceptualised, notably in regards to ‘grey zone’ 
operations. Lastly, it reviews the question of how to engage with the issue of the effectiveness of 
such strategies.  
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Why ‘Hybrid’ warfare in Asia? 
The term hybrid warfare has recently attracted a great deal of scholarly attention 
predominantly in relation to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. In 
strategic and security studies, such events have contributed to produce a shift in focus 
on the on-going debate about the transformation of warfare. Away from investigating 
irregular tactics employed by non-state actors, scholarship has re-engaged with the 
study of the consequences of the use of asymmetric and non-linear strategies by both 
great powers and weak states. (Hoffman, 2007; Hammes, 2006; Galeotti, 2016; Giles, 
2016; Lanoszka, 2016). Within this literature, the use of the word ‘hybrid’ in relation to 
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state actors has implied strategies that mobilise a variety of state levers of power, 
producing a blend of conventional and non-conventional tactics aimed at keeping the 
use of force under the threshold of open war. In the context of major power 
competition, the use of such hybrid strategies has been predicated upon the 
assumption of an intention to limit military escalation (in some cases under the cover 
of a nuclear umbrella). 
 
This literature has not, however, given much attention to Asia. This is surprising since 
this part of the world offers a potentially fertile ground for the study of the 
‘hybridization’ of contemporary warfare. Asia is home to the world’s second and third 
largest economies and, as data from the International Institute of Strategic Studies 
suggest, the region’s defence spending continues to rise, having surpassed Europe in 
2012 (IISS 2012).1 Such economic and military power is being mobilized by established 
and emerging powers with diverse political systems to compete over the future of the 
region’s security architecture. From an economic perspective, growing 
interdependence is contrasted with alternative visions of the normative frameworks for 
maintaining stability at sea and on land and to promote prosperity and growth. From 
the Chinese-sponsored Belt and Road Initiative to the Japanese vision of a Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific region, military, diplomatic and economic tools are being mobilised 
to pursue seemingly competing ideas of regional order and security. Further, regional 
state actors with complex and diverse geography, history, and cultural heritage, 
notably in Southeast Asia, have had to face challenges from non-state actors 
domestically and trans-nationally – challenges that seem to have increased with the 
advent of global jihadism. 
 
Within this context, a first counterintuitive observation is that in Asia, state and 
non-state actors alike do in fact deploy hybrid strategies to achieve their political 
agendas. Yet, this topic remains largely outside the scope of the literature on hybrid 
warfare – as much as of that on Asian security. Why is this the case? How can this gap 
be reduced? This observation represents a driving motivation behind this special issue, 
leading to the formulation of a series of questions. How can (and should) we 
understand hybrid warfare in the Asian region? Is hybrid warfare taking shape in 
ways potentially distinct from other parts of the world? What are its implications for 
security in the region and beyond? How can external actors with long-term stakes in 
the region prepare for the increasing prevalence of hybrid approaches to strategy? And, 
 
1 ‘Asia Defence Spending to Overtake Europe’, Financial Times, 07 March 2012. 
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has the ongoing hybridization of national strategies in Asia the potential to lead to a 
fundamentally different security order in the region? These questions underscored the 
preparation of this issue, although the main goal of the contributors was not to offer 
definitive answers to all of them. Rather, it was to start a wider conversation, one 
linking a main debate in the field military and strategic studies to the agenda of Asian 
security studies. 
 
Insofar as the preliminary question of why understanding ‘hybridity’ in the Asian 
context matters, the ensemble of the papers in this issue seem to suggest three reasons. 
The first has to do with the role that hybrid courses of action have had in Asian history. 
The second has to do with Asian geography and its impact on preferences for hybrid 
strategies. The third reason relates to the question that hybrid strategies seem to be the 
preference of a weaker party. On the first reason, historically, strategy in Asia has long 
featured aspects of hybridity. Whether in the case of the security interactions in the 
Korean Peninsula (see Bowers), or in the context of Chinese security practice (see 
Patalano), and non-state actors in Southeast Asia (see Ong), regional strategies have 
long featured characteristics that would enable them to be regarded, to some extent, as 
hybrid. Indeed, from this perspective, an analysis of the current strategic situation in 
Asia does not give the impression of ‘novelty’ in the way of the European and 
trans-Atlantic ‘discovery’ of Russian ‘new’ way of war. 
 
This, in turn, raises the issue of the explanatory value of employing the term ‘hybrid’. 
A review of recent hybrid activities in the region would suggest that indeed there is 
value in using the term to examine trends in the region. In particular, the combined 
analysis in this issue suggests that more and more actors are choosing to combine 
various methods of fighting that are available to them, drawing not merely upon hard 
capabilities; rather, they seek to combine different levers of national power, from the 
legal, to the political, and the economic, as much as upon military assets in a fashion 
that is consistent with the way in which hybridity has been used to examine Russian 
activities. For example, in the Asian context, as Alessio Patalano’s essay shows, China 
has both the ambition and capabilities to develop a sophisticated hybrid strategy, 
encompassing a highly integrated use of military and non-military capabilities 
combined with a creative reconfiguration of the legal and communication aspects of 
security.  
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In this issue, the attempt to examine hybrid courses of actions to emphasise the links 
between different levers of power implies that the notion of ‘hybridity’ is a type of 
strategy for both state and non-state actors in the region. By looking at hybridity as a 
strategy, the essays in this issue seek to explore the challenges of hybrid warfare not 
from the perspective of their effects – as it is the case in most of the literature on 
Russian hybridity. Instead, the different essays seek to examine preferences for 
hybridity linking ends to available means and resources, within specific limitations, 
internal or external to the actors in concern. From this perspective, what emerges from 
the overall issue is an important point about how, while technology is creating a 
permissive environment for hybrid warfare to develop, hybridity may indicate a 
strategy making the best of inherent limitations in available options, rather than an 
optimal strategy. This seems to be the case especially looking at the contributions by 
Stephen Biddle, Ian Bowers, and Ong Wei Chong.  
 
A second reason that makes the question of hybrid strategies in Asia of significant 
interest within the context of the wider debate over the hybridization of contemporary 
warfare is its link to geography. As French geopolitical expert Franxois Joyaux noted in 
the early 1990s, Asian geography and security are inherently intertwined, especially 
the central role that the maritime domain has in connecting (or dividing) the majority 
of regional actors(Joyaux, 1993). In this respect, Asian geography stands at the opposite 
spectrum of that of Europe – where the regional sea basins are peripheral to the main 
continental focus. Authors in this issue identify the critical importance of geography – 
especially maritime geography – as a condition that gives rise to particular forms of hybrid 
warfare as strategy. Hence, Ong argues that the new Sino-US competition over access 
and the use of the maritime commons has contributed to inform the development of 
China’s hybrid strategy and the US responses to it. Such observations echo Hew 
Stratchan’s argument that Russian success in Ukraine owes more to context-specific 
strategy than the utility of hybrid warfare as a category per se[as cited in Renz, p. 288].  
 
In Asia, the impact of maritime geography on hybrid strategy is particularly significant 
in China’s case. As Patalano argues, Beijing’s development of a wide spectrum of 
maritime capabilities – military, constabulary, and paramilitary – matches China’s 
pursuit of a coercive strategy with claims to sovereign rights in the East and South 
China Seas as well as to assert a broader strategic role. Within this context, Chinese 
strategy is hybrid in that it seeks to mobilise asymmetric capabilities – especially from 
the coast guard and the maritime militias – under the guise of seemingly sound legal 
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regimes and political rhetoric to prevent or limit responses. Chinese strategy in these 
maritime theatres would appear to be consistent with a longstanding facet of Chinese 
approach to warfare, i.e. the one concerning the three warfares (Patalano and Ong in 
this volume). 
 
This link between maritime geography and hybrid strategy is perhaps one of the 
reasons why in the Asian context, scholars have favored the term ‘grey zone 
conflict/strategy’ (including the government of Japan as analyzed in this volume by 
Takahashi). This expression is by and large employed to focus on the operational space 
between war and peace where coercion is used to keep conflict ‘below the traditional 
thresholds of high-end war’. However, as this issue demonstrates, the utility and 
appropriateness of the term remains highly debatable. Ong identifies that the notion is 
helpful in accounting for the changing character of the conflict space – i.e., the blurring 
of boundaries of the war-conflict-peace spectrum. On the other hand, Patalano is more 
critical of the empirical utility of the expression given the danger of escalation and the 
impossibility of establishing when specific tensions occur where the threshold bar is set. 
Regardless of these different positions, contributors to this volume seem to agree that 
grey zone conflicts in Asia are not historically unprecedented, challenging mainstream 
work in this field. From the contributors’ perspective the grey zone conflict is at heart a 
hybrid strategy, which in the Asian context plays out predominantly in the maritime 
domain. 
 
As a third consideration, exploring the question of hybridity in the Asian context 
points to use of this type of strategy as essentially an option of the weaker party. The 
notion of ‘weakness‘ may be related to matters of perception or actual capabilities 
differentials; however, it is first and foremost about ‘relative’ differences – since 
Chinese strategy in regards to the United States, for example, may very well be 
different than Chinese strategy vis-à-vis ASEAN states with competing maritime 
claims. In competition against the United States and its allies, a hybrid strategy is 
inevitably an attractive option to create an impasse in the form of deterrent stalemate, 
whilst avoiding an escalation to all-out, open war (see Bowers, Ong in this volume). 
However, the effectiveness and consequences of the strategy need to be critically 
examined. The analyses contained in this volume underline that, despite the assumed 
potential of hybrid strategies to secure stated aims, the reality may point to different 
possibilities, ranging from highly escalatory strategic interlock to the formation of a 
mutually-hurting stalemates. Bowers in this volume, for example, analyzes the 
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situations in which hybrid warfare ceases to exist; namely, when current impasse gives 
way to a break-up to an open warfare; and when the current hybrid warfare as waged 
in stalemate transforms into volatile irregular warfare. Patalano, on the other hand, 
rules out the interpretation that hybrid warfare itself is inherently limiting to the 
lower-end of the conflict space. As he argues there is a real danger for war to erupt out 
of the cumulative strategic impact of lower-end of the spectrum initiatives such as the 
Chinese militarization of artificial military outposts in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. 
 
With these three reasons in mind, the rest of this introduction will first develop, based 
upon the review of the existing concept(s) of hybrid warfare, an analytical framework. 
Such a framework will be complemented by a definition of key terms before 
summarizing the structure of the volume and of the articles in it.  
 
 
What’s in a concept? : Setting the analytical framework for Hybrid Warfare 
Hybrid warfare as a concept has been used to characterize a variety of wars. The term 
has been used to characterize any of the following: a) irregular fighting methods, 
combined with sophisticated weapons, command and control, and combined arms 
tactics; b) the modes of warfare, in which conventional and irregular methods are 
mixed in the same theatre of battle; and c) the subordination of military methods to 
strategic communications. 
 
The upsurge in domestic and localized conflict since the end of the Cold War 
heightened interest among Western analysts to better comprehend the changing nature 
of war, giving rise to theories about the breakdown of Clausewitzian trinity (Creveld, 
1991), or the effect of globalization and the rise of identity politics (Kaldor, 1998). 
Amidst these trends, the term hybrid warfare has gained much currency, as it seems to 
capture not only the increasing availability of high-tech weapons to non-state actors, 
whose mastery of these weapons surpassed the expectations of many Western 
observers, but also the merging of various modes of warfare in contemporary armed 
struggle. Hence, the term hybrid war gained recognition at the time of the 2006 war 
between the Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon, where the former’s remarkably 
conventional defence against Israel’s potent conventional force surprised many 
observers. Frank Hoffman observed that ‘Hezbollah’s fusion of several distinct “modes 
of warfare” left the Israelis struggling with targeting and force protection’ (Hoffman 
2007). Taking stock of related concepts such as 4th Generation Warfare (Hammes, 2006), 
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Compound Wars (Huber, 1996), Unrestricted Wars (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999), as well 
as analyses put forward by US and Australian defence establishments (US Department 
of Defense, 2005), Hoffman noted that future wars will not be squarely categorized into 
simple classification of conventional or irregular modes of conflicts (such as traditional, 
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive as compiled by the 2005 US National Defence 
Strategy). Rather, he recognized that the particular feature that characterizes 
contemporary and future conflict would be the convergence of alternative or different 
methods of war (Hoffman 2007, p.28), arguing that hybrid wars will “blend the 
lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare 
(ibid).2 
 
Articulations such as that of Hoffman did not remain without critique, conceptually or 
empirically. One such criticism was that hybrid warfare was historically ‘not new’. 
(Mansoor, p.3). Angstrom draws on within-case analysis of the conduct of war by two 
“hybrid” actors, the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami, during the past thirty years in 
Afghanistan, and finds that “hybrid represents an important continuity and strategic 
option in Afghan warfare”, with an important qualification that hybridization is a 
“contingent result of the dynamics of some conflicts but not others” (Angstrom, 2017, p. 
838). For military historians, such as Murray and Mansoor, hybridity has always been 
part of warfare (Murray and Mansoor, 2012; US Department of the Army, 2010). 
Indeed, their volume on hybrid warfare analyzes various historical cases, including 
those from Asia, notably, Imperial Japanese Army’s operation in North China 
(Yamaguchi, 2012) and Vietnam (Lowe, 2012).  
 
Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine prompted a new wave of debates about 
hybrid warfare. In Crimea, Russia’s aggressive policy of territorial annexation created a 
fait accompli, without provoking much reaction from the Western nations, just as its 
covert support to separatists in eastern Ukraine where Russian-speaking population 
was the majority dramatically increased incidents of open conflict. Russian actions in 
these incidents involved the coordinated and combined use of “conventional and 
unorthodox methods of warfare, including the use of covert Special Forces as 
 
2 Hoffman defines the notion rather broadly as: “Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states 
and a variety of non-state actors. Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of 
warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts 
including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” (p.4) 
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provocateurs, (dis)information campaigns by media outlets, cyber-attacks, and even 
leveraging its oil and gas resources to exert economic pressures.” (Bachmann and 
Gunneriusson, 2015, p.200). Many characterized this course of event as representing a 
‘new way’ of warfare (ibid.)  
 
Conceptually, the event aroused interest in how to characterize the seemingly “new” 
Russian actions, at the same time giving rise to a heated debate if this war had 
anything new at all (Galeotti, 2016; Rens, 2016; Giles, 2016; Charap, 2015). In the lack of 
a clear Russian doctrine on the matter (Charap, 2015; Galeotti, 2016), the concept and 
characterization of hybrid warfare has so far mirrored more the Western debates and 
understanding of unfolding events in Eastern Europe (Rens, 2016, pp.285-286).3 Given 
the prevailing ambiguity, analysts variedly used terms such as “ambiguous warfare” 
(UK House of Commons Defence Committee, July 2014), “full-spectrum 
warfare”(Johnson and Seely, 2015), or “non-linear” war (Pomerantsev, 2015). 
 
Without a general agreement, ensuing debates soon led to a more critical scholarly 
position on the utility of the concept of hybrid warfare. For example, Lanoszka noted 
that Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine rendered the existing definition of 
hybrid war (as a combination of regular and irregular methods) unsatisfactory. The 
Russian combined regular and irregular methods of fighting; on the other hand, in 
Crimea these actions did not accompany the use of regular forces until Russian control 
of the peninsula was already secured (Lanoszka, 2016, p.178). Charap has argued that 
there is an inherent danger in labeling Russian methods as part of a hybrid strategy, 
since, to date, there is no clear Russian doctrine on ‘hybrid war’ (Charap, 2015, p.52). 
Again, the notion of hybrid war as (allegedly) applied by Russia in Eastern Europe is of 
limited acceptance amongst historians, who have no problem describing recent actions 
with other traditional terms, such as limited war and crisis management (Freedman, 
2015; Freedman, 2014; Strachan, 2010). Experts further note that hybrid warfare is not a 
new Russian invention, having similar methods being employed before (Lanoszka, 
2016; Renz, 2016; Galeotti, 2016).  
 
Despite these conceptual challenges, the unfolding events in Europe profoundly 
impacted the concept of hybridity, in such a way that the notion has come to contain 
 
3 The oft-cited article by the Russian Chief of General Staff, Valerii Gerasimov (2013) has been 
wrongly attributed as the sources of Russian approach to hybrid war. See Renz (2016), p. 286. 
See also Giles (2016), p 10.    
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some inherent tensions, or even dichotomies, which have some significant implications 
for the situation in Asia.  
 
First of all, there is the irregular/non-state- and state/great power dichotomy. With the 
advent of Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine, the notion has now come to capture, 
or imply, the heavy state and great power involvement in hybrid confrontations. As a 
result, it has created some interesting tensions within a literature that was previously 
concerned with initiatives of irregular actors with access to high-tech weaponry—just 
as the concept was initially developed by Hoffman and others (although state ‘hybrid’ 
actor was also part of hybridity). The emergence of a great power focus resonates with 
the Asian region’s heavily state-dominated security dynamics. 
 
Second, there is a tension between the idea of hybrid warfare as a form or mode of 
warfare versus its understanding as part of a strategy. Hoffman’s definition focused on 
hybrid warfare as a method of merging of regular and irregular forms of warfare. 
Today, there is greater emphasis on its qualities as a strategy, although the former still 
retains relevance. As Lanoszka argues, the hybrid course of events in Crimea and 
eastern Ukraine indicates Russia’s deliberate choice of means to achieve specific sets of 
foreign policy goals in these places (Lanoszka, 2016). Hence the form necessarily 
follows the intent and the context. This understanding of hybridity as a strategy 
contrasts with the previous emphasis on the merging of different ‘modes’ of warfare, 
although these two dimensions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the case of 
Russian actions in Ukraine, as a form, they emphasized the coordinated use of 
irregular and regular methods to achieve ends that were different but complementary 
(ibid., 179).  
 
Third, there is a dichotomy developing between decentralized command of hybrid war 
(such as in irregular or networked insurgency) and centralized hybrid war under a 
single, unified command. With or without reference to the term ‘hybrid warfare’, a 
number of analysts concluded that one of the genuine new developments in the case of 
Russian action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the unifying of various arms of 
national power, including the military and non-military, the economic, social and 
informational (Charap, 2015; Jonsson and Seely, 2015; Galeotti, 2016,). Hence, Jonsson 
and Seely argue that the more appropriate term than hybrid warfare to describe 
Russian actions in Ukraine is “Full Spectrum Conflict”, denoting “a centralized 
command and control that enables a high degree of coordination” (Jonsson and Seely, 
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2015, p. 6). The essence of such centralized command was that “[A]ll levels of the 
Crimean operation were coordinated to the same political aim” (ibid., p. 7), in 
implementation of the infamous Clausewitzian thesis whereby war is an act of force for 
a political end, which, to their view, permitted the theory and conduct of Russian 
forces. While this in theory resembles the model of single command in Western 
approach to “integrated approach” (whether it is implemented or not), and hence 
cannot be really called a ‘new’ way of thinking, this aspect, if it is to be seen a 
characteristics of hybrid warfare, complements the older focus on the merging of 
conventional and irregular modes of war. 
 
Last but by no means least, there is a dichotomy between the focus on (the modes of) 
physical violence on the one hand, and information and other ‘non-kinetic’ elements 
on the other. The term hybrid war is now increasingly seen as implying the 
subordination of military operations to strategic communication - including most 
notably information and psychological operations (Jonsson and Seely, 2015, p.4; 
Galeotti, 2016; Giles, 2016). At the least, the term implies coordination or synchronisation 
of military operations with strategic communication. The importance of the 
communication domain – which in itself is historically not new as many would argue -- 
can be understood in the context of strategic coercion as inherent to hybrid 
confrontations. The link would rest on a dynamics of ‘plausible deniability’ (denial of 
one’s own involvement) to deter external intervention by confusing the potential 
opposition, denying responsibility, and forging a sense of popular support in the target 
area (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 180). Russian action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine also 
involved the use of strategic communication, such as de-linking different incidents – to 
control risks of escalation (Bachmann and Gunneriusson, 2015), where information 
dimension was key to affect physical violence. Analysts have always noted the 
importance of information domain, or narratives, in hybrid warfare (Hoffman, 2006), 
but the emphasis seems to shift to the relative importance of communication and 
information domains vis-a-vis military one, regular or irregular (Bolt, 2012).   
 
Applying a framework: Hybrid warfare in Asia 
 
The four dichotomies identified above underpin the investigation of the concept of 
hybrid warfare in the Asian context presented in this issue. First of all, the question of 
the applicability of the notion of ‘hybrid warfare’ in the region is intertwined with the 
rise of China, a major state actor. Since April 2012 - when Chinese vessels seized the 
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Scarborough shoal and launched a new phase of coercive actions in the region - several 
regional state actors have grown concerned of China’s ability to successfully exploit the 
space between peace and war by means of hybrid strategies. This is particularly true in 
the context of territorial disputes, where competing claimant states from India to 
Vietnam, to Japan, fear that China may attempt to capture, through the use of mixed 
military and non-military capabilities, disputed territories or islands, and they worry 
about consequences of such actions. 
 
Hence, the hybridization of major power strategies is a serious concern in the region, 
elevating the theoretical as well as policy debates concerning hybrid warfare beyond 
those involving irregular and non-state actors and asymmetry along those confines.4 A 
meaningful line of enquiry in this context, then, concerns the exploration of the 
possibility for regional major powers such as China to change the regional strategic 
balance by the means of a hybrid strategy. Related to this, another question pertains to 
the possibility of hybrid activities conducted by major powers to escalate to full-scale 
wars in this region.  
 
In this context, it is interesting to note what Lanoszka identified as a contradiction of 
hybrid warfare (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 180). In hybrid warfare, hybrid actors seem to resort 
to both irregular warfare and the threat of military escalation for mutually 
contradicting purposes, where the former may imply aversion to military escalation, 
and the latter intended to destabilize its target and deter reactions. Such a dynamic, 
originally identified in Russian actions, may be applicable to the Asian context as well, 
implying some room for a serious miscalculation leading to conflict escalation. The 
Chinese use of ‘salami tactics’ is the case in point. Hence, the seeming attempt to 
confuse the targeted actor to avert military reaction (i.e., taking only a small slice of 
salami) stands at odds with the establishment of a fait accompli that may invite 
escalation – rather than preventing it.   
 
A further meaningful consideration in this context concerns the question of whether 
hybrid war is a strategy of an anti-status quo power (Lanoszka, 2016). While some may 
agree with such characteristics in the context of Russian action in Eastern Europe, in 
theoretical terms there is nothing inherent in the concept itself that denotes specifically 
anti-status quo behavior. Indeed, this is where the information dimension of hybridity 
 
4 On a related consideration of asymmetric strategies for major powers, see Breen M. and J. A. 
Geltzer(2011), 41-55. 
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becomes significant because the meaning of ‘status-quo’ itself is disputed and is the 
source of contention and contentious behavior. Hybrid warfare can be, and often is, a 
strategy of revisionist powers, but it does not have to be so. Depending upon what the 
political aim is (for example, reclaiming a lost territory or spheres of influence; trying 
to secure the existing regime or offset its relative weaknesses, as in the case of North 
Korea), hybrid warfare can be a strategy of both anti-status quo and status-quo powers. 
Often, indeed, political aims are hard to specify and prone to change over time, while 
intentions are hard to detect. For example, in the Asian region, while North Korea can 
be viewed as holding either a revisionist or status-quo aims, its use of hybrid warfare 
has been a constant feature since the Korean War. Further, this observation may imply, 
ironically, that even status-quo powers’ hybrid strategy may provoke chain reactions 
that may result in an escalation.  
 
The growing focus on state actors in the literature, however, does not change the 
reality of threats and risks posed by hybrid tactics used by non-state actors in the Asian 
region, as Ong points out in his paper. Of particular relevance today is the infiltration 
of Islamic State (IS) fighters in Southeast Asia. States in the region are hence faced with 
the need to prepare for both state and non-state actors employing hybrid strategies, 
and to prevent and prepare for serious potential destabilization and challenges to state 
authority (see also below.).  
 
Secondly, the dichotomy between hybrid warfare as referring to modes of warfare or 
strategy offers a viable starting point for the analyses of confrontation in the Asian 
region. The concept of hybridity necessarily relies on both aspects. Modes of warfare 
and strategy need not be mutually exclusive. However, the concept of hybrid warfare 
as a strategy, a choice of (hybrid) means to an end, has historically been relevant in the 
Asian context. As the ensuing analyses will show, hybridity has always been a means 
to serve a political purpose in the region, in an essentially Clausewitzian dictum, as the 
actors struggled to deal with variety of opponents, either state, great or small, or 
non-state, that all use a variety of methods. In this context, states, such as North Korea, 
have not always been associated with conventional warfare and vice versa, non-state 
actors in the region have historically been backed up by, or used conventional 
capabilities.  
 
In that sense, as articles in this volume show, it may be questionable to understand 
state and non-state actors, and further, conventional and irregular modes of warfare as 
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distinct categories; both may be better perceived as a continuum. Regardless of state or 
non-state status, different actors may choose most effective means to achieve their aims, 
which can be highly strategic/comprehensive or tactical, limited or opportunistic, with 
an important caveat that the choice is within their political, institutional and 
environmental confines. Analysis by Biddle in this volume shows that it would be no 
longer possible to equate state actors with conventional capabilities and non-state ones 
with irregular capabilities, but rather, both form a continuum. He goes on to argue that 
“’[t]he very distinctions between ‘conventional’, ‘irregular’, and ‘hybrid’ warfare are 
actually differences of degree rather than kind” . 
 
A third issue concerns the question of the centralization of command systems and to 
what extent such centralization is an asset in the context of a hybrid strategy. As the 
incident in 2010 where a Chinese fishing boat clashed with two Japanese Coast Guard 
ships in the East China Sea indicated, it is not always very transparent from the outside 
if a nation’s various military, constabulary and irregular agencies are commanded by a 
central entity, particularly if command can be delegated to lower or regional levels.5 
Articles in this volume, however, seem to suggest that the benefit to hybrid actors of 
integrated command, including military, paramilitary and constabulary elements, and 
most importantly, information dimension, is well-understood by the region’s political 
leadership, resulting in policy and institutional adjustments.  
 
In the Asian context, it is worth pointing out that the main state actors pursing 
seemingly hybrid strategies, China and North Korea, possess centralized political 
systems. Authoritarian systems in theory are more favorably disposed towards 
centralized command structures than their democratic counterparts, especially in the 
information domain. In this context, Ong and Bowers explore how both China and 
North Korea use hybrid methods to gain strategic advantages, rather than often 
causing physical (or “kinetic”) effects. The centralized regime of North Korea, hence, 
has tried to offset its isolated, weaker strategic position by using a variety of 
capabilities that “range across the spectrum of state instruments of power” in any 
combination of them, under a particular aim, be it political, economic or strategic.  
 
 
5 Recent research reveals a clearer picture of Chinese command system over its maritime militia, 
where the command authority is divided between PLA and local governments, for example, See 
Kennedy and Erickson (2017).  
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China also finds hybridity helpful to offset the perceived “challenge” to China’s 
peaceful development, and uses in a highly integrated manner “a multi-dimensional 
set of military and non-military, including information, capabilities (Ong in this 
volume). North Korea, as Bowers underlines, utilises cyber warfare as a “controllable 
and deniable means” for political, economic and strategic purposes. It has targeted 
ROK government, media, banks, and infrastructure including Korea Hydro and 
Nuclear Power. And in so doing, it employs 6800 people to operate under the auspices 
of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, following a restructuring and centralization of 
disparate cyber units.     
 
Lastly, the relative importance of controlling the degree of physical violence/kinetic 
elements, is another contentious issue in the hybrid literature which is highly relevant 
to evolving events in Asia. Specifically, state and non-state actors in the region seem to 
maintain a keen eye on the management of strategic communication to either reduce 
reliance on kinetic actions (or maximize the impact of limited military or constabulary 
coercion), or to deceive intentions behind coercive actions. Thus far, there has been no 
case equivalent to the Russian annexation of Crimea, where the information domain 
was handled by Russia for the strategic effect of preventing military escalation or 
Western intervention, through the use of communications to mask its own 
involvement, exploiting Western lack of resolve. The review provided in this volume 
suggests, however, that a broad range of information operation capabilities are 
available and being actively used by states in Asia. Their effect seems to draw benefit 
from the centralized nature of state actors with control over media, internet access, and 
so on. Strategic communication is used in combination with various forms of coercion 
to achieve maximum effect.  
 
Evidence in this volume supports the view that state actors in Asia use strategic 
communication to confuse observers and to prevent military reaction or external 
intervention, hence augmenting the effect of their war-fighting capabilities through the 
effective use of information campaigns. Bowers notes that North Korea heavily relies 
on ‘deniability’ of its attacks, not only in cyber attacks but even in cases such as the 
landmine explosion in 2015 in DMZ that injured severely two South Korean soldiers. It 
is characteristic, also, for China to resort to repeated “sub-threshold” expansions in 
both China Seas, in order to create fait accompli without provoking strong military 
reactions (Takahashi in this volume.) Such sub-threshold actions are normally 
accompanied by Chinese use of various argumentations, or claims to certain rights, to 
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“explain” its action to external audiences by means of legal “cherry-pickings” 
(Patalano in this volume). 
 
Such argumentations reflect the Chinese intentions to either downplay the asymmetry 
of Chinese capabilities, or to create an image where such Chinese actions are reaction 
to situations created by others, and not vice-versa. China’s strategic communication 
also covers Chinese domestic audiences to sell the bellicose image of the opponents as 
attempting to establish militaristic domination in the maritime domain that is within 
Chinese sovereignty. Such incidents cover the US presence in the South China Sea or 
with regard to the Japanese-administered islands of Senkaku (Diaoyu as the Chinese 
claim it) in the East China Sea. (Patalano in this volume). 
 
What Implication so far? The regional hybrid action-reaction dynamics 
Authors in this volume agree that hybrid warfare is not a “war-winning strategy”. It 
may even be counter-productive; hybrid warfare seems to be – in some cases such as 
North Korea –a counter-productive strategy as it is actually contributing to exacerbate 
the very effects it tries to offset. In other cases, it may also trigger escalation into 
high-end limited military confrontations, such as in the case of China’s maritime 
disputes in the China Seas. Stephen Biddle takes this consideration one step further, 
and assets that, if given a choice, all actors, be they non-state or state actors, would 
prefer resorting to conventional war.    
 
Despite such uncertainties, hybrid courses of action remain a preferred choice because 
of their short-term ability to confuse an adversary, inhibiting immediate reactions. 
Bowers’ article in this volume remind us that whilst conventional balance stands firmly 
in favor of deterrence, it is increasingly difficult to develop responses to the 
imaginative use of hybrid methods (in any combination) by North Korea. Ong’s article 
in this volume also stresses that for both state and non-state actors prominent in the 
region, it is not at all easy to prepare to deal with highly complex hybrid operations in 
order to avoid destabilization by hybrid attacks, particularly given the volatile mix of 
ethnicity and social factors in the region. On the other hand, hybrid strategies have 
been reinforcing perceptions that action is required to defuse their utility. The case of 
Japan is of particular interest in this regard. The Japanese government’s concern with 
hybridity (or “grey zone” events) predates Chinese military assertiveness in the China 
Seas. However, Takahashi argues that the main challenge now concerns the question of 
effective deterrence, namely, preventing revisionist actors from establishing faits 
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accomplis. He hence proposes existing deterrence theory to be revised to incorporate 
“grey-zone” contingencies.  
 
Defining the key terms 
Against this preliminary conceptual background, hybrid warfare is broadly conceived 
in this special issue as “the blending of conventional and non-conventional methods to 
achieve political-military objectives by both state and non-state actors; as such, it 
implies an ends-means link inherent in a strategy.” This conception is similar to the 
key NATO definition of hybrid warfare, which is constantly referred to in this volume: 
hybrid warfare involves hybrid threats, “those posed by adversaries with the ability to 
simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in 
pursuit of their objectives” (NATO, 2010).6 The special issue stresses the view that 
hybrid warfare is a means to an end, adopted for a political purpose, while retaining 
the relevance of modes of warfare in comprehending hybridity. The mode of warfare – 
i.e., the merging or simultaneous use of conventional and non-conventional methods – 
remains part of such conception, but it becomes an aspect that is subordinated to 
strategy, hence used flexibly by actors depending upon context. 
 
This definition is not intended to constrain the contributors in this volume, who may 
find it necessary to challenge existing conceptual assumptions. It is intentionally broad 
and implies that both state and non-state actors could resort to such forms of warfare. 
In theory, the definition does neither preclude that various actors, state or non-state, 
may act in concert/in liaison with one another, nor rule out the broad range of 
methods used by hybrid state, non-state or combined actors, including criminal, cyber, 
or informational. (Bowers in this volume; Hoffman, 2010; Mansoor, 2012). The 
definition also has in mind the possibility that hybrid actors may choose targets to 
exploit various economic and social vulnerabilities of the opponent, hence indicating a 
broadening interface of warfare and the civilian world (Bowers in this volume; Liang 
and Xiangsui, 1999). As a starting point of analysis, the above shown definition of 
hybrid warfare is given, incorporating earlier observed dichotomies, from which 
various considerations and critiques may be advanced according to context. 
 
6 A slightly expanded and more updated version of NATO defeinition is as follows: a broad, 
complex and adaptive and often highly integrated combination of conventional and unconventional 
means, overt and covert activities, by military, paramilitary, irregular and civilian actors, which are 
targeted to achieve (geo)political and strategic objectives . 
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War itself is conceived in this issue as Clausewitz defined, i.e. “an act of force to 
compel our enemy to do our will”(Clausewitz, 2008), hence, involving physical 
violence. Most of all, war is subordinated to policy. This classic conceptualization does 
not, however, limit the agents of war to state actors (Clausewitz himself did not) or the 
nature of violence to conventional (again, Clausewitz himself did not). Some aspects of 
hybrid warfare may not involve direct use of violent means; rather they may involve 
the application and the use of (paramilitary or constabulary) force in a tailored fashion, 
by diverse actors, to control escalation and inhibit relevant military responses. To the 
extent that hybrid wars may involve attacks on social and economic activities in the 
broad sense in order to disrupt the war-executing capacities of the opponent, or 
attempts to change the parameters of conflicts, such actions may well amount to 
coercive acts intended to influence the opponent’s will, thus sharing the political 
dimension of warfare as traditionally defined.  
 
The Issue Explained: The Content’s Structure 
Stephen Biddle’s opening paper explores the determinants of non-state actor methods, 
thereby providing, for the purpose of this volume, an empirically-based template to 
consider how non-state actors (and nothing in the theory prevents us to consider by 
extension the state actors) choose fighting methods. As technology makes a 
conventional mode of fighting more achievable to a greater number of actors, 
conventional war-fighting has become a strategic option for non-state actors, who have 
been traditionally seen as to fight with irregular methods; this forms the basis of his 
assumption that all things being equal, all actors will prefer conventional war fighting 
as this is more effective. Providing empirical analysis on this global trend, the paper 
points out the importance of a systematic theory of non-state military behavior and 
choice to understand and anticipate how they fight and why. 
 
The paper attempts to develop such a theory by focusing on internal politics of 
non-state actors, especially their institutional structure and war aim. They are 
important because implementing conventional military methods requires the complex 
cooperation among interdependent specialists. Thus, the paper illustrates, those actors 
with more institutionalized (rather than personalized) internal politics and existential 
conflicts (rather than limited-stake conflicts) with outsiders are more likely to choose 
conventional war-fighting methods. Such an observation poses a significant challenge 
to the traditional debate on “hybrid” warfare because it indicates any actor can choose 
  18 
any method –regular, irregular or hybrid—of war fighting: ‘The net result is thus likely 
to be increased variance.’ 
 
The reminder of the special issue is devoted to specific policies of key state actors in the 
region. The first article provides an overview of the global hybridization of warfare 
manifested in the Asian region, identifying key clusters of hybridization focusing on 
China, North Korea and global jihadist networks, ISIS in particular. The paper written 
by Ong examines the fact that these actors constantly blur the boundaries of the 
war-conflict-peace spectrum to gain relative advantage. Here, the paper argues that a 
hybrid approach’s main feature is the attractiveness of the possibility to advance 
strategic objectives whilst keeping the risk of war low. With this understanding, the 
paper adopts the term ‘grey zone conflict’, which is about the blurring line between 
war and peace, and combines such understanding with his analysis of hybrid warfare.  
 
Indeed, due to the military superiority of the US and its potential strategic interest in 
Asia, actors in the region, whilst willing to change a status quo or gain relative 
advantage, are not aiming to resort to high-end war. Because of a series of coercive 
actions ‘below the traditional thresholds of high-end war’ that actors in the regions 
resort to, their strategy is often described as ‘grey zone strategy’. Finally, this paper 
will address the impact of the constant pushing of boundaries in hybrid warfare, its 
unintended consequences and what states can do to counter hybrid threats.     
 
Turning to the Korean peninsula, a long-term flash point in Asia, Bowers argues that 
hybrid warfare has been a long-standing element in the perennial conflict on the 
Korean peninsula. Since the end of the fighting in the Korean War, to gain strategic or 
political advantage in its ongoing conflict with South Korea, North Korea has 
consistently utilized hybrid warfare, resorting to a mixture of military techniques 
ranging from state-sponsored terrorism, to propaganda to cyber warfare. This hybrid 
approach has altered in-line with changes in North Korea’s economic capacity and 
technological capabilities. On examining the North Korean hybrid strategy, Bowers 
emphasizes the importance of the specific context, in which ‘DPRK is a relatively weak 
state actor opposed by a superior state actor in a strategic environment framed by a 
frozen war [or deterrent-stalemate]’. Under such a condition, the paper points out, its 
strategy is basically deterrence-based, aiming to weaken military countermeasures of 
South Korea and its alliance with the US. The attractiveness of the strategy is that it 
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‘allows Pyongyang to meet both policy and strategic goals without crossing a 
threshold which may result in threats to the regime’s survival.’ 
 
This resonates well with the initial consideration about escalation dominance and the 
contradictory method of irregular warfare aiming to limit the threshold of conflict. The 
paper indicates the fact that South Korea is one of the most experienced states to deal 
with the hybrid threats that characterise much of the today’s modern warfare. 
Furthermore, Seoul’s evolving strategic approach to North Korea betrays increasing 
hybrid elements. Being short of full-scale conventional conflict, the Korean peninsula 
will remain as a good test-case with which to examine the impact and effectiveness of 
hybrid warfare. 
 
Sugio Takahashi subsequently explores the development of Japanese defence policy 
and strategy to respond to hybrid warfare. He argues that although many security 
challenges emerge today in the gray space between wartime and peacetime, traditional 
thinking on deterrence has instead focused on preventing war. Thus, gray-zone 
security challenges such as risks of fait accompli and probing have been recognized as 
challenges which are difficult to deter. Both in Asia and Europe, however, this kind of 
challenge is a serious and immediate concern, and appropriate concept building and 
policy response are required. In Japan, since late 2000s, gray-zone security challenges 
are treated as a priority issue and two strategy documents, the National Defense 
Program Guidelines in 2010 and 2013, reflect this perception. This article will tease out 
the characteristics of gray-zone security challenges and how Japan develops concept 
and policy responses to such challenges. Takahashi especially notes the importance of 
developing what he identifies as the principles of gray zone deterrence, which will 
hinge upon the government’s ability to combine denial and punishment to deter 
hybrid attacks, and the mobilization of all government assets. 
 
The last paper argues that Chinese maritime coercion is best described as ‘hybrid 
strategy’ (NATO’s definition), not ‘grey zone’. Patalano argues that China’s 
constabulary coercive activities in the ESCS relate to ‘the legal objective of controlling 
parts of the sea’, aiming at ‘showing presence and control of uninhabited offshore 
island’ or ‘disputing other parties claims and control’. These activities, as well as 
Chinese maritime territorial claims, should be understood in the broader political and 
strategic goals to ‘project power within and beyond the ESCS’. It is here, the paper 
argues, ‘grey zone strategy’ cannot describe Chinese strategy well because it fails to 
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differentiate military and constabulary activities, and thus the layer of tactics and 
strategy. The paper points out that in Chinese maritime strategy constabulary 
coercions is functionally subordinated to military coercion. In that sense, the claim of 
‘grey zone strategy’ also wrongly assumes the distinction between war and peace. The 
paper argues that in China’s strategy “the deployment of capabilities and the use of 
force is tailored to the specific context and circumstances, not to an ambition to avoid 
armed clashes.” By critically comparing the notion of grey zone conflict and hybrid 
warfare through the Chinese maritime strategy, the paper highlights important utility 
of hybrid warfare as a concept and its specific relevance to the security environment in 
Asia. 
(7,814 words)
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